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THE TRAVELING TAXPAYER: A RATIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR HIS DEDUCTIONS
JoHN D. MiLToN, JR.*

KEMPTON P. LoGAN**
RALPH E. TALLANT, J.**
INTRODUCTION

Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for a deduction of

traveling expenses' that are ordinary and necessary to the pursuit of a trade
or business and incurred "while away from home.' 2 While seemingly plain
in its import, this statutory provision has defied uniform interpretation for
more than 50 years. 3 In particular, the Internal Revenue Service and the
courts have been continually troubled with the meaning of the phrase "while
away from home." Although the phrase seems to connote absence from one's
primary place of residence, the phrase has been interpreted to mean absence
from one's primary place of business by the Commissioner 4 and a majority
of the courts. 5 This interpretation has been appropriately labeled the "tax
home concept." 6 Its application has created much of the confusion that pervades the traveling expense deduction.
In an effort to clarify the area, this article reexamines the origins of the
statutory language and the tax home concept. 7 The history of the statutory
provision is first analyzed and a uniform interpretation of its terms is proOBA. 1969, University of Virginia; J.D. 1973, University of Florida; Member, the
Florida Bar, The Jacksonville Bar.
**BA. 1971, University of Florida; J.D. 1973, University of Florida; Member, the
American Bar Association, The Florida Bar, The Lee County Bar.
***B.A. 1972, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; J.D. 1975, University of Cincinnati; L.L.M. 1976, University of Florida; Member, The American Bar Association, The
Tennessee Bar, The Chattanooga Bar.
1. Travel expenses have traditionally been defined to include costs of transportation,
meals, and lodging, both in route and while away from home overnight. See Commissioner
v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470, 1946-1 U.S.T.C. 9127 at 55. (1946); TREAs. ReG. §1.162-2(a).
2.
3.

INT. REv.CoDE OF 1954, §162.
See J. CHOMMIE, THE L w OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §46, at 101 (1968); Haddle-

ton, Traveling Expenses "Away from Home," 17 TAx L. Rlv. 261 (1962); Note, A House is
Not a Tax Home, 49 VA. L. Rav. 125 (1963).
4. See, e.g., G.C.M. 23672, 1943 CuM. BuLL. 66..
5. Compare Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927) ("home" as place of business), with
Burns v. Gray, 287 F.2d 698, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. 9127 (6th Cir. 1961) ("home" as place of
residence). See also Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 290-91, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. 9309
(1967) (dicta).
6. Note, supranote 3.
7. Problems such as the combination business and pleasure trip and educational travel
expenses will not be discussed in this article, but the general tests developed herein would
apply to them. Similarly, the substantiation and burden of proof requirements to be
met by a taxpayer claiming a travel, transportation, or commuting expense deduction
are outside the scope of the article.
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posed. After discussing administrative rulings and case law interpreting the
statute and presenting various factual situations that illustrate the problems
challenging any uniform rules of statutory interpretation, the article concludes with selected recommendations for administrative and statutory
change.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The provisions of section 162 related to the deductibility of traveling
expenses are the following:
(a)

. . . There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and

necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business, including .. .
(b) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and
lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under
the circumstances) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade
business ....
8
The language in the initial clauses of section 162(a) was derived from
the Revenue Acts of 19139 and 1918.10 The 1913 Act simply allowed as a
deduction "the necessary expenses actually paid in carrying on any business ...."I In 1918 the requirements were modified to encompass only expenses
that were both ordinary and necessary and to allow deduction of such
expenses in the taxable year incurred by accrual method taxpayers without
regard to the actual year of payment. The 1918 additions completed the
legislative development of the current general deduction provision of sec12

tion 162(a).

The first administrative rulings regarding the deductibility of traveling
expenses were issued by the Treasury under the 1918 Act. For example,
Solicitor's Memorandum 104813 took the position that a salaried employee's
commuter fares to and from work were not deductible because they were
essentially personal expenses. Noting that commuting expenses were induced
by both business and personal considerations, the ruling held that the test
for deductibility as a business expense is "whether an expense is incurred
primarily because of business as the immediate cause inducing the expenditure."1 4
This primary and immediate causation test did not prevent the deductibility
of all transportation expenses. The first regulations promulgated under the
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
9. Revenue Act of 1913, §I B, 38 Stat. 167.
10. Revenue Act of 1918, §214(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1066.
11. Revenue Act of 1913, §11 B, 38 Stat. 167.

12. Revenue Act of 1918, §214(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1066. In full the section read: "That in
computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: (1) All the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business ....
13. S. 1048, 1 CuM. BULL. 101 (1919).
14. Id. at 102.
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1918 Act allowed a deduction for unreimbursed transportation expenses
induced by the terms and conditions of a contract of employment.15 Meal
and lodging expenses incident to such required transportation were initially
held to be nondeductible since they were viewed as primarily personal in
nature. 16 As such, these expenses were encompassed by the predecessor of the
present section 262, which provided that personal and family expenses were
not deductible."7 In 1920 the Treasury modified this position by declaring
that meal and lodging expenses incidental to qualifying transportation
expenses were deductible to the extent that they exceeded the normal
costs of meals and lodging when the taxpayer was at home."' The rationale
for the deduction was that the excess portion of the expenses was induced
by business rather than personal considerations. However, the Treasury
emphasized that only the excess could qualify for the deduction since
"wherever a person may be, at home or abroad, he necessarily must have
personal and living expenses which in any event are not deductible."'19
No amount was deductible for meal and lodging expenses under the
Treasury's approach unless the taxpayer actually incurred duplicate living
expenses while away on business.2 0 Furthermore, the amount of the deduction
was not to be increased beyond the excess by the fact that his expenses at
home continued while he was incurring these duplicate expenditures on the
road. 21 The Treasury's approach meant that meal and lodging expenses
would be deductible only to the extent that they were attributable solely to
business considerations.
In 1921 Congress intervened to provide that "traveling expenses (including
the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in
the pursuit of a trade or business"22 were deductible in addition to those
allowed under the general language of what is now section 162(a).23 The

O.D. 451,2 CuM. BULL. 157 (1920).
16. Id.; Mim. 2688, 4 CuM. BULL. 209 (1921).
17. Revenue Act of 1918, §215, 40 Stat. 1068.
18. T.D. 3101, 3 Cums. BULL. 191 (1920).
19. Mim. 2688,4 Cum. BULL. 209 (1921).
20. O.D. 905, 4 CuM. BULL. 212 (1921) (meal and lodging expenses of a single taxpayer
continuously on the road and without any permanent home completely disallowed).
21. Mim. 2688, 4 Cum. BULL. 209, 210 (1921). The ruling explained: "[T]he fact that
15.

expenses may continue at home must be disregarded entirely, provision having been made

for them in [section 215]. Expenses at home become material only in arriving at the
ordinary and necessary expenses required by the individual taxpayer for meals and
lodging when at home, for this is the basis used in determining what expenses for
meals and lodging may be attributed to the business."
22. Revenue Act of 1921, §214(a)(1), 42 Stat. 239. The wording of §214(a)(1) of the
Revenue Act of 1921 has been carried over verbatim into §23(a)(1) of the 1939 Code and
§162(a)(2) of the 1954 Code. In 1963, §162(a)(2) was amended by the deletion of "(Including
the entire amount expended for meals and lodging)" and the substitution of "(including
amounts expended for meals and lodging other than amounts which are lavish or
extravagant under the circumstances)." Act of October 16, 1962, PUB. L. No. 82-834, §4,
76 Stat. 976.
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §162(a). The new language in the 1921 Act was joined
to the previous language of the 1918 Act by the term "including," which indicated an

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. XXIX

House Committee Report described the amendment as one to "permit . . .
the deduction of all traveling expenses incurred in the pursuit of a trade
or business, instead of the more limited deduction for such expenses allowed
under the present law."24 References to the amendment in floor debates are
generally consistent with the Committee Report's suggestion that it was
intended only to remove the excess limitation and not to change existing
25
requirements for the deduction.
Despite this evidence of a limited legislative purpose, the Commissioner
has subsequently regarded the amending language as the source of the controlling statutory requirements for the deductibility of traveling expenses. 26
Consequently, he has shifted from the previously controlling requirements
of (1) primary and immediate causation plus (2) duplication of living expenses
to one of "away from home in the pursuit of business."27 The result has
been that traveling expenses obviously induced by business needs are not
considered deductible unless incurred away from home; "home" has in turn
been given the tortured interpretation of primary place of business.2
A ProposedAlternative Interpretation
A primary stimulus behind the 1921 amendment was the request of the
Treasury that the scope of the meal and lodging expense deduction be
broadened from its previous excess limitation to include all on-the-road meal
and lodging expenses. 29 It seems logical, therefore, that Congress might
borrow from prior administrative language in expressing its will regarding
the amendment. The available evidence indicates that it did. For example,
intent to extend the scope of the deduction without amending the requirements under
prior law.
24. H. R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong. 1st Sess. 11 (1921).
25. This conclusion is partially supported by the lack of any reference in the committee reports or congressional debates on the amendment to the infusion into the statute
of new requirements for obtaining the deduction. See S. RmnP. No. 275, 67th Cong. 1st
Sess. 13 (1921); H.R. REP. No. 350, 67 Cong. 1st Sess. 11 (1921). Senator Walsh noted in floor
debate that the language of the amendment "was considered by the committee . . .
from the standpoint of allowing the exemption to traveling salesmen. It was thought that
their traveling expenses were a matter for proper deduction and that their meals and
lodging should also be included in such deduction." 61 Cong. Rec. 6672 (1921). This
comment certainly suggests no additional qualifications for the deduction, but corroborates
the argument that there was no intent to change existing law.
26. See, e.g., I.R.S. Publication No. 300, 2 CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1350.
27. See, e.g., Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181, 1184 (1927).
28. See, e.g., Masline v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 1328, 1972-2 U.S.T.C. 9524 (5th Cir.
1972); Curtis v. Commissioner, 449 F.2d 225, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9666 (5th Cir. 1971). One
writer has asserted that "it would appear that Congress gave no consideration to the
formulation of a definition of "home" other than that which was in common usage and,
indeed, would have rejected, had it been proposed, the present concept of 'tax home'
Haddleton, Traveling Expenses Away From Home, 17 TAX L. REv. 261, 263 (1962).
29. See Hearing on H. R. 8245 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 67th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1921). Section 215 (comparable to §262 of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954) was a barrier
to a similar administrative solution since it specifically prohibited any deduction for personal
and family expenses, and a certain portion of meal and lodging expenses on business
trips was necessarily of such prohibited character. See note 21 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/4

4

Milton et al.: The Travelling Taxpayer: A Rational Framework for His Deductions
TRAVELING TAXPAYER

the language employed by the Treasury in amending its regulations under
the 1918 Act to include the excess portion of meal and lodging expenses
within the deduction read "expenses incident to meals and lodging while
absent from home on business during the taxable year."30 The phrase
"number of days away from home during the calendar year on account of
business" also appeared in the regulations."' These phrases bear a remarkable
resemblance to the language of the 1921 statutory amendment "(including
the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home
in the pursuit of business. .

. ."2 If

in fact this statutory language was merely

a paraphrase of the prior administrative language with the addition of "entire
amount," the tenable conclusion is that Congress in 1921 did not intend to
modify the qualifying requirements for the travel expense deduction, but
infended only to increase the amount of a taxpayer's deduction once it
qualified under the tests previously applied.
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that it allows the words
of the 1921 amendment to be given their ordinary meanings. Under this
approach, the troublesome phrase "away from home" can simply be read
as a statutory enactment of the administrative rule under the 1918 Act that
the taxpayer must incur duplicate living expenses to be allowed any deduction
for meal and lodging expenses.,33 In short, the tests of deductibility under the
post-1921 statutes could remain the same as the pre-1921 tests except that
qualifying meal and lodging expenses would now be fully deductible rather
34
than only to the extent of the excess over at home expenses.
Such an interpretation of sections 162(a) and (a)(2) is preferable to the
Commissioner's current position primarily because it accords with both the
substance of the available legislative history and the common usage of the
statutory language involved. Furthermore, as the remaining portions of the
article make dear, this interpretation would produce substantially the same
results in the majority of the myriad factual situations that have been litigated
under this statutory language, without the necessity for the many exceptions
now required by the application of the Commissioner's general rule.
Application of ProposedInterpretation
The application of the interpretation urged here would first entail a

breakdown of traveling expenses into the separate components of (1) transportation and (2) meals and lodging. The pre-1921 primary and immediate
30. T.D. 3101, 3 CuM. BULL. 191 (1920).
31. Id.
32. Revenue Act of 1921, §214(a)(1), 42 Stat. 239.
33. See, e.g., O.D. 905, 4 CUM. BULL. 212 (1921); Mim. 2688, 4 CuM. BULL. 209 (1921);
T.D. 3101, 3 CUM. BULL. 191 (1920).
34. In fact, some of the first Treasury rulings under the 1921 Act appeared to suggest
this approach in that their concern over the definition of the "away from home" language
was solely for purposes of maintaining the duplication requirement for meal and lodging
expenses. See I.T. 1497, 1-2 CuM. BULL. 89-90 (1922); I.T. 1490, 1-2 CuM. BULL. 89 (1922).
Only later did the Commissioner confuse this language with the requirements of the
"primary and immediate" causation test. See Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181, 1184 (1927).
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causation test would then be applied to the transportation component to
determine whether it was directly attributable to business needs. This test 35
is essentially the test announced by the Supreme Court in the landmark case
of Commissioner v. Flowers3 6 under the label "exigencies of the business." If
the transportation expenses qualify under this test, they are deductible.
For the meals and lodging component, the applicable tests are more
numerous. In the first place, meal and lodging expenses will be deductible
only if incident to business related transportation, and in practice they
must qualify as expenses generated by the exigencies of business.37 Secondly,
they must have been incurred while away from home. Under the interpretation
suggested by this article, home is one's primary place of residence; consequently, the second hurdle is merely a codification of the pre-1921 administrative requirement that the taxpayer incur duplicate living expenses.38 Its
effect is simply to prevent deduction of personal living expenses if the
traveler has no home or, when the traveler may be said to be carrying
3
his home on his back.

9

The third qualification for meal and lodging expenses is the requirement
enacted by the 87th Congress that they not be "lavish or extravagant under
the circumstances."40 In effect, this requirement is only a reincarnation of
the reasonable and necessary requirement applicable to all section 162 expenses. Its separate restatement was, however, required in section 162(a)(2) because the "entire amount" language of the 1921 amendment had suggested
41
that it might have been waived as to meal and lodging expenses.
The final hurdle for meal and lodging expenses is the requirement that
they be incurred incident to travel involving necessary sleep or rest. 42 This

last requirement is grounded on rather shaky statutory foundations, but its
acceptance by the Supreme Court in 196743 makes any arguments for its re35. The factual considerations involved are virtually the same as those employed in
determining what portion of the expenses of a combination business-pleasure trip is deductible. See, e.g., Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F.2d 108, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. 9310 (5th Cir. 1961);
Rev. Rul. 63-266, 1963-2 GuM. BULL. 88.
36. 326 U.S. 465, 474, 1946-1 U.S.T.C. 9127, at 56 (1946). See text accompanying note
62 infra.
37. Meal and lodging expenses will never be deductible under §162(a)(2) if the transportation component fails to qualify, since they would not there qualify as business-induced
"traveling expenses." Similarly, when incident to deductible transportation, these expenses
will often be directly attributable to business and therefore deductible. However, this latter
result is not a necessary conclusion as the "exigencies of the business" test must be
separately applied fo these expenses as well. See note 35 supra, regarding the combination
business-pleasure trip.
38. See notes 13-19 supra.
39. See, e.g., Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9241 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1972); I.T. 1490, 1-2 CUM. BULL. 89 (1922); O.D. 905, 4
CUM. BULL. 212 (1921).

40.

Revenue Act of 1962, PUB. L. No. 87-834, §4(b), 76 Stat. 976, amending INT.

CODE OF 1954, §162(a)(2).
41. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962-3

CUM. BULL. 405, 430; S.
No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962-3 CuM. BULL. 707, 744.
42. See text accompanying notes 44-63 infra.
43. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 9101 (1967).
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jection practically moot. It is therefore incorporated into the statutory interpretation proposed here and is used as a basis for dividing the discussion of
the administrative and case law immediately to follow.
The transportation element of the traveling expenses having qualified
under the exigencies of the business and reasonable and necessary tests, and
the meals and lodging component having survived the requirements of
(1) conjunction with business-motivated transportation, (2) away from home,
(3) reasonableness, and (4) incidence to necessary sleep or rest, the traveling
expenses can then be said to have qualified for deduction under sections
162(a) and (a)(2).
Having presented this background and the basic elements of the statutory
interpretation proposed by this article, further discussion of the utility and
application of this model is deferred until after subsequent analysis of presently
controlling administrative and case law. This analysis consists of two major
parts, the first dealing with travel situations involving necessary sleep or
rest and the second treating their counterparts that consist solely of transportation expenses.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
OF SECTION 162

Travel Involving Sleep or Rest - Section 162(aX2)
The bulk of the voluminous litigation concerning deductions for expenses
incurred on overnight trips and longer absences from a taxpayer's residence
has centered around the inherent conflict between the allowance of the
deduction for travel expenses" under section 162(a)(2) of the Code, and the
disallowance of a deduction for "personal, living or family expenses" under
section 262.-1 Faced with a seemingly infinite variety of fact situations, the
Service and the courts have developed particularized concepts and doctrines
in attempts at reconciliation. The theories of the travel deduction have
developed unevenly and have not provided a logical and workable framework within which problem areas can be simplified.
The Tax Home Concept
As indicated earlier, it is not clear whether Congress even considered the
precise meaning of the phrase "away from home."4 6 The Treasury and most
courts, however, have interpreted "home" to mean something quite different
from one's house or residence. This tax home concept was born in Mort L.
Bixler47 when the Board of Tax Appeals, interpreting section 214(a)(1) of
the Revenue Act of 1921, explained:
Traveling and living expenses are deductible . . . only while the
taxpayer is away from his place of business, employment, or the post
44. See note 1 supra.
45.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §262.

46. See note 27 supra.
47.

5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927).
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or station at which he is employed. . . We think section 214(a)(1)
intended to allow a taxpayer a deduction of traveling expenses while
duty or place of employment on duties connected
away from his post of 48
with his employment.
One problem the Board attempted to avoid was the possibility of a
taxpayer maintaining a residence at a distance from his primary place of
employment and deducting his commuting expenses49 or living expenses incurred at the primary place of employment. Unfortunately, the Board chose
to avoid this admittedly undesirable result by shifting the taxpayer's tax home
to his place of business. Commuting expenses had previously been held to be
nondeductible because they were personal expenses that were the result of a
personal choice as to location of the taxpayer's residence.5 0 Thus, nondeductibility of commuting expenses had previously been predicated on the
absence of business necessity for the expense, rather than a failure of the
taxpayer to be away from a fictional tax home.
In any event, the tax home concept flourished thereafter. 51 The position
of the Commissioner, the Board of Tax Appeals, and later the Tax Court,
however, was soon eroded as the cases began to reach the Courts of Appeal.
Several circuits questioned the 5tax home concept and at various times treated
home as the place of residence. 2
The first to reject the constraints of the fictional home definition was
the Ninth Circuit in Wallace v. Commissioner.53 Ina Clair Wallace, an actress,
resided with her husband in San Francisco. During 1939, she spent seven
months in Hollywood working on a motion picture while her husband remained in San Francisco. Reasoning that she was not away from home since
her place of employment in Hollywood constituted her tax home, the Tax
Court disallowed a deduction for her Hollywood living expenses. In rejecting the Tax Court's construction of the statutory term "home," the court
48. 5 B.T.A. at 1184 (emphasis added).
49. See Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913, 917, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. 19160, at 11,037
(4th Cir. 1945) for a subsequent expression of specific concern in this regard.
50. Frank H. Sullivan, 1 B.T.A. 93 (1924).
51. G.C.M. 4956, VII-2 CUM. BULL. 128, 129 (1928); G.C.M. 23672, 1943 CuM. BULL. 66, 67.
52. Second Circuit: Six v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 66, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9694 (2d Cir.
1971). Fifth Circuit: Flowers v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 163, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. 9227 (5th
Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 465 (1946); but see Curtis v. Commissioner, 449
F.2d 255, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9666 (5th Cir. 1971) (abode at place of business). Sixth Circuit:
Brandl v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 697, 1975-1 U.S.T.C. 9414 (6th Cir. 1975); but see Ham
v. United States, 408 F.2d 671, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 6292 (6th Cir. 1969). Ninth Circuit: Doyle
v. Commissioner, 354 F.2d 480, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. 9162 (9th Cir. 1966); but see Wills v.
Commissioner, 411 F.2d 537, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 9401 (9th Cir. 1969). The split was solidified,
however, by the acceptance of the "tax home" doctrine by the First, Third, Fourth, Seventh
and Eighth Circuits. First Circuit: Amoroso v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 583, 1952-1 U.S.T.C.
9135 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 926 (1952). Third Circuit: Chimento v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1971). Fourth Circuit: Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d
913, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. 9160 (4th Cir. 1945). Seventh Circuit: England v. United States, 345
F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966). Eighth Circuit: Jenkins v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 1292, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 9135 (8th Cir. 1969).
53. 144 F.2d 407, 1944-2 U.S.T.C. 9437 (9th Cir. 1944).
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argued that if Congress had intended such an artificial meaning of the word,
"it would have used a more appropriate term to express such an intent."' 54
The deduction claimed was allowed.
One year later, the Fifth Circuit decided Flowers v. Commissioner.55
Flowers was an attorney and a longtime resident of Jackson, Mississippi.
Desiring to maintain his residence in Jackson, Flowers nonetheless accepted
a position as general counsel for a railroad in Mobile, Alabama. Although
required to be in Mobile occasionally, he had arranged with his employer to
perform most of his duties in Jackson. The Tax Court denied his deduction
for meals and lodging in Mobile and his transportation expenses between
the two cities on the ground that the expenses were personal living expenses
since they were not incurred away from his tax home, that is, his post of
duty in Mobile. 56 In reversing, the Fifth Circuit joined the Ninth in interpreting the word "home" in the statute to mean one's place of residence.
Only fifteen days after the Flowers decision, the Fourth Circuit's contrary
decision in Barnhill v. Commissioner5 7 emphasized the need for a final
determination of the controversy by the Supreme Court. Justice Barnhill had
maintained his residence in Rocky Mount while serving a term as a North
Carolina Supreme Court Justice. The Tax Court determined that his tax
home was in Raleigh, the state capital, and that his meals and lodging
expenses were not deductible as they were not incurred away from home.58
In affirming the Tax Court's decision, the Fourth Circuit held that "home"
could not mean residence since such a ruling would open the door for the
deductibility of commuting expenses. 59 Because Congress assumed that a
person would live in close proximity to his place of business, the court believed the necessary conclusion was that home was the general locale in which
one resided and also maintained his place of employment. 60
The conflict was ripe for resolution when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Flowers. The Court, however, while acknowledging the conflict,
found it unnecessary to decide the meaning of the statutory requirement
54. Id. at 410, 1944-2 U.S.T.C. at 10,898.
55. 148 F.2d 163, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. 9227 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
56. J.N. Flowers, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 14.082 (1944). This fact situation highlights
the ineffectuality of attempting to determine the deductibility of otherwise normal living
expenses solely on the basis of the location of "home." If home were considered the
place of business, taxpayer's meals and lodging in Jackson would be deductible; if considered the place of residence, as done by the Fifth Circuit on appeal, his living expenses
in Mobile would become deductible.
57. 148 F.2d 913, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. 9260 (4th Cir. 1945).
58. Maurice v. Barnhill, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 13,967 (1944).
59. 148 F.2d 913, 1945-1 US.T.C. 9260 (4th Cir. 1945). The court relied on the reenactment rule, reasoning that because Treasury regulations denying deductibility for
commuting expenses had been maintained and enforced throughout successive reenactments of the statute, the definition of home must be consistent with that result. The
court failed to realize that the regulation denied the deduction because commuting
expenses were not "business" expenses. See, e.g., Tkxm. REG. §19.23(a)(2)(C) (1943). There
was no implication that commuting expenses were denied because they were not incurred
"away from home."
60. 148 F.2d at 917, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. at 11,037.
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"away from home." Instead, it chose to affirm the disallowance of the deduction for the reason that the expenses were incurred because of personal choice
rather than because of the exigencies of business. 61 The opinion identified
the following as requirements for claiming a deduction for traveling expenses:
(1)
(2)
(3)

The expense must be a reasonable and necessary traveling
expense, as that term is generally understood ...
The expense must be incurred "while away from home."
The expense must be incurred in pursuit of business. This means
that there must be a direct connection between the expenditure
and the carrying on of the trade or business of the taxpayer or
of his employer .... 12

Because Flowers failed to satisfy the third requirement, the Court chose not
to decide whether expenses had been incurred "while away from home." 63
Exigencies of the Business Requirement
After Flowers, preoccupation with the location of the tax home began
to subside in some instances with a shift to the more fundamental inquiry
of the cause of the expenses. The notion that Congress expected taxpayers
to live in the vicinity of their work, as expressed in Barnhill v. Commissioner"

61. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 1946-1 U.S.T.C. 19127 (1946).
62. Id. at 473, 1946-1 u.s.r.C. at 56. These requirements do nothing more than reiterate
the specifications of §162(a)(2), which allows a deduction for all ordinary and necessary
business expenses, including travel expenses away from home in the pursuit of business.
For deduction of any business expenses, then, the ordinary-necessary requirement of the
statute would encompass requirements (1) and (3) of Flowers in that they must be reasonable, necessary, and primarily and immediately caused by the demands of business. Thus
it appears that a travel deduction is merely an ordinary and necessary business expense
with the additional requirement that it be incurred away from home.
63. The Supreme Court also introduced a new source of confusion in its explication
of the business exigencies requirement. In one of several statements of the requirement
in the opinion, the Court explained that traveling expenses would be disallowed when
"not incurred in the pursuit of the business of the taxpayer's employer." 326 U.S. at 473,
1946-1 U.S.T.C. at 56 (emphasis added).
Decisions followed which seemed to interpret this statement to mean that deductible
expenses must be incurred because of an employer's requirements. See, e.g., Commissioner
v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483, 486, 1957-2 U.S.T.C. 110,045, at 58,633 (4th Cir. 1957), aff'd per
curiam, 358 U.S. 59 (1958); Ford v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 297, 299, 1955-2 U.S.T.C.
9767, at 56,144 (4th Cir. 1955); Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 521, 523 1948-1 U.S.T.C.
9153, at 133 (4th Cir. 1948). Other decisions indicated that construction workers employed
by many firms and independent contractors could not deduct travel expenses incurred
in pursuit of their trades. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Janss, 260 F.2d 99, 1958-2 U.S.T.C.
9873 (8th Cir. 1958); Benson v. Godwin, 164 F. Supp. 70, 1958-2 U.S.T.C. 9751 (E.D. Ark.
1958); Grover Tyler, 13 T.C. 186 (1949). It appears settled today, however, that an employee
may have a trade or business independent of that of his employer and that expenses incurred in pursuit of the trade or business of being an employee may be deductible. TR.AS.
REG. §§1.162-2(d); Thomas ]-. Kiah, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 31,043 (1971); Rxv. RUL.
60-189, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 60; Rev. Rul. 190, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 303, 305; I.T. 4012, Cum.
BULL. 1950-1, 33.
64. 148 F.2d 913, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. 9160 (4th Cir. 1945).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/4

10

Milton et al.: The Travelling Taxpayer: A Rational Framework for His Deductions
1976]

TRAVELING

TAXPAYER

in connection with the tax home concept, could be as easily expressed in
terms of the reason for the expense. This approach seemed to make more
sense in terms of the conflict between the deduction allowed by section
162(a)(2) and the disallowance of a deduction for personal living expenses
by section 262. Thus, the inquiry began to focus on whether the taxpayer's
employment (or trade or business) required the expenses of transportation,
meals, and lodging, or whether they were the result of the personal choice
of the taxpayer.65
This change in focus is most evident in a line of public servant cases
decided after BarnhilL In these cases, state officials were allowed to deduct
meal and lodging expenses incurred while performing duties away from
their residences when local law required the continuance of residency in
local districts away from their principal places of employment.- Sigificantly,
these public servant cases gave little or no attention to the location of the
67
taxpayers' homes.
The Temporary versus Indefinite Exception
Employees are often assigned temporarily by their employers to duty
stations in areas away from their regular employment. Self-employed persons,
such as construction workers, are often forced to leave their regular work
areas for varying periods of time to find work. In these and similar situations,
it is difficult to determine the location of a taxpayer's home for purposes of
section 162(a)(2). The solution adopted by the Commissioner6s and a majority
of the courts69 is that the location of a taxpayer's home is deemed to remain
at the regular duty station unless the anticipated duration of the new assignment is "indefinite," as opposed to "temporary."
The first indication that a deduction might be allowed for a taxpayer
working on a "temporary" assignment came in Coburn v. Commissioner.7o
Charles Coburn, a theatrical actor and manager, maintained an apartment
65. See, e.g., United States v.Leblanc, 278 F.2d 571, 1960-1 U.S.T.C. 9472. (th Cir.
1960); Ford v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 297, 1955-2 U.S.T.C. 19767 (4th Cir. 1955); Eminent
v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 322, 1955-2 U.S.T.C. 9642 (S.D. Ind. 1957); Moss v. United
States, 145 F. Supp. 10, 1956-2 U.S.T.C. 10,001 (W.D. S.C. 1956).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Leblanc, 278 F.2d 571, 1960-1 U.S.T.C. 9472 (5th Cir.
1960) (state supreme court justice); Eminent v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 322, 1955-2 U.S.T.C.
9672 (S.D. Ind. 1957) (state supreme court justice); Moss v. United States, 145 F. Supp.
10, 1956-2 U.S.T.C. 110,001 (W.D. S.C. 1956) (public service commissioner).
67. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §162(a): "For purposes of the preceding sentence
[allowing for travel expenses deduction], the place of residence of a Member of Congress
(including any Delegate and Resident Commissioner) within the State, congressional
district ... which he represents in Congress shall be considered his home, but amounts
expended by such Members within each taxable year for living expenses shall not be deductible for income tax purposes in excess of $3,000."
68. See Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 Cur. BULL. 60; Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL.
60.
69. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Mooneyhan, 404 F.2d 522, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 9106 (6th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1001 (1969).
70. 138 F.2d 763, 1943-2 U.S.T.C. 9652 (2d Cir. 1943).
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residence in New York City which he used alternately as a business office.
During the year in question, he spent 263 days making a movie in California
under five short-term contracts. Conceding that a taxpayer's tax home is
normally his place of business, the court nonetheless concluded that Coburn's
home was in New York since the term home, even if construed to mean place
of business, "ought to be limited to the place where he is regularly employed
71
or customarily carries on business during the taxable year."
The temporary versus indefinite rule was apparently first recognized by
the Tax Court in Harry F. Schurer. 2 Schurer, a plumber who maintained a
residence in Pittsburgh, received temporary job assignments through his local
union at locations not within daily commuting distances of his residence.
The court assumed that the taxpayer's home was Pittsburgh rather than the
temporary job assignment locations and allowed a deduction for meals and
lodging at the job sites and for transportation there and back. The Schurer
case was subsequently relied on in Leach v. Commissioner,73 in which the
taxpayer had no regular station of employment but for 49 weeks out of the
year was assigned to various construction sites at substantial distances away
from his residence in Florence, Alabama. Concluding that the taxpayer had
no tax home, the court, nevertheless, allowed the deduction since it found
that he could not be expected to move his wife and child to those places for
the short duration of each job.7 4 Thus at this stage of its development, 75 the
temporary versus indefinite rule was applied as an exception to the second
76
Flowers requirement that the taxpayer must be "away from home."
In Commissioner v. Peurifoy,77 the Supreme Court assumed the temporary

versus indefinite distinction to be valid but applied it as an embroidery on
the third requirement of Flowers - the expenses must be due to the exigencies
of the employer's business.7 8 The appeal in Peurifoy was by three construction
workers who maintained their residences approximately 100 miles from the
construction site where they were employed for periods of 20, 12, and 8
71. Id. at 764, 1943-2 U.S.T.C. at 10,254.
72. 3 T.C. 544 (1944), acquiesced in, 1944 GUM. BULL. 24.
73. 12 T.C. 20 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
74. The current approach to the Leach fact situation is found in Rev. Rul. 71-247,
1971-1 CUM. BULL. 54, which creates an exception to the tax home concept. The "home"
of a taxpayer such as Leach is considered to be the location of his house.
75. The Treasury has expressed the temporary versus indefinite rule as a clarification
of the tax home concept. I.R.S. Pub. No. 300, 5 CCH 1956 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6347.
Essentially, the tax home is deemed the taxpayer's regular post of duty. If the taxpayer's
work takes him away from that post for an "indefinite" period of time, his tax home
shifts with his new post of duty. However, if the assignment is only "temporary," the
location of the taxpayer's home does not change.
76. Other decisions subsequent to Flowers but prior to the Fourth Circuit's opinion
in Peurifoy applied the temporary versus indefinite exception without placing the distinction within the context of the Flowers requirements. See, e.g., Robert K. Denning, 14
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 21,156 (1955); T.G. Frazier, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 19,921 (1953);
Lewis F. Cooper, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 19,634 (1953).
77. 358 U.S. 59 (1958) (per curiam).
78. The Commissioner's contention that Peurifoy stood for the proposition that a post
of "indefinite" employment is the taxpayer's home was rejected in Harvey v. Commissioner.
283 F.2d 491 1960-2 U.S.T.C. 9771 (9th Cir. 1960).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/4

12

Milton et al.: The Travelling Taxpayer: A Rational Framework for His Deductions

19761

TRAVELING

TAXPAYER

months, respectively. Following the Leach rationale that taxpayers could not
reasonably be expected to move their residences to the construction site, the
Tax Court had allowed a deduction for meal and lodging expenses incurred
at the construction site.7 9 The Fourth Circuit reversed, however, reasoning that
the temporary 'versus indefinite exception did not apply because the employment at its inception was uncertain and indefinite.8 0 The Supreme Court
affirmed the factual determination that the employments involved were indefinite rather than temporary."' The decision, however, only raised doubts
as to which requirement of Flowers the temporary versus indefinite exception
applied.
Although the Commissioner and most courts have continued to apply the
temporary versus indefinite rule as an exception to the "away from home"
requirement, 2 some courts have applied Peurifoy as an exception to the
business exigencies requirement.8 3 There should be no difference in the
ultimate result under section 162(a)(2) no matter which of the two Flowers
requirements is considered to be subject to the exception.8" Under either
approach the ultimate issue is whether the taxpayer's decision not to move
permanently resulted from business considerations or personal choice. The
important point is that the temporary-indefinite distinction is now an accepted
part of the judicial gloss on section 162(a)(2).
The factual question of whether the duration of the taxpayer's stay is
temporary or indefinite has proven to be extremely troublesome. The Commissioner's position is dear: if termination of the taxpayer's work away from
his regular post of duty can be foreseen within a "fixed or reasonably short
period of time," then the duty is temporary.8 5 Although neither the Commissioner nor the courts have attempted to prescribe any specific length of time
as being "reasonably short," the Commissioner presumes "indefinite" classification in cases of "anticipated or actual duration of a year or more at a
79. James E. Peurifoy, 27 T.C. 149 (1956).
80. Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483, 1957-2 U.S.T.C. 1110,045 (4th Cir. 1957).
The court also held that the expenses were not due to the exigencies of the employer's
business.
81. 358 U.S. 59 (1958) (per curiam).
82. See Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 Cum. BULL. 60; Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 CUM. BULL.
60. See also Jones v. Commissioner, 444 F.2d 508, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 59461 (5th Cir. 1971);
Commissioner v. Mooneyhan, 404 F.2d 522, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. %9106 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 1001 (1969); Dyer v. Bookwalter, 230 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Mo.- 1964); Emil J.
Michaels, 53 T.C. 269 (1969). acquiesced in 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 3; Frank M. Norris, 35 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. %33,667 (1976); Bruce A. Pappas, 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 133,240 (1975).
83. See, e.g., Six v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 66, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 19694 (2d Cir. 1971);
United States v. Mathews, 332 F.2d 91, 1964-2 U.S.T.C. 19506 (9th Cir. 1964); Benson v.
Godwin, 164 F. Supp. 70, 1958-2 U.S.T.C. %9751 (E.D. Ark. 1958); Richard W. Beebe, 80
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. %31,136 (1971).
84. See text accompanying notes 176-182 infra for a discussion of the possible application of the temporary versus indefinite distinction in determining the deductibility of
transportation expenses under the general language of §162(a).
85. Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 CuM. BULL. 60. The corresponding test for "indefinite"
is "it termination cannot be foreseen within a fixed or reasonably short period." I.R.S.
Pub. No. 300, 5 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP. f6347.
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particular location."8' 6 Similarly, the Commissioner normally will not
challenge a deduction on this ground when both the anticipated and actual
duration are less than a year.
The emphasis should be placed on the taxpayer's expectations of the
length of stay. It is possible, of course, that what originally was expected to
be temporary employment may later become indefinite.1 Actual duration is
evidence of a taxpayer's initial expectations, but should not be regarded as
conclusive. Many cases, however, do not credit the taxpayer with the initial
anticipation of temporary employment and have therefore denied deductions
for the periods before the taxpayers could reasonably expect the durations
of their assignments to be more than temporary. 88
Opposition to the Commissioner's tests of temporary and indefinite was
expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Haruey v. Commissioner.89 The taxpayer
in Harvey was an employee of the Douglas Aircraft Company who maintained
a residence for his family in El Segundo, California. He was subsequently
transferred by his employer to Edwards Air Force Base, approximately 117
miles from his residence. The duration of the assignment at the time of
commencement was unknown, and thus indefinite, but could have lasted
from a few months to two years. The taxpayer actually remained at Edwards
for about two years. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's disallowance
of a deduction for the taxpayer's living expenses while at Edwards. Arguing
that the aim of Congress was apparently "to equalize the burden between the
taxpayer whose employment requires business travel and the taxpayer whose
employment does not,"'9 0 the court dispensed with the requirement of
"definiteness" in the Commissioner's test and instituted a new, more subjective standard.
An employee might be said to change his tax home if there is a reasonable probability known to him that he may be employed for a long
period of time at his new station. What constitutes "a long period of
time" varies with the curcumstances surrounding each case. 91
Apparently substituting a temporary-permanent test for the temporaryindefinite standard, 92 the court deemed the critical consideration to be whether
See Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 Cum. BULL. 60; Rev. Rul. 60-89 1960-1 CuM. BULL.

86.

60; Rev. Rul. 60-314, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 48.
87. See Robert J. Carr, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 31,487 (1972); Harold C. Pike, 30
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 31,012 (1971); Beatrice H. Albert, 13 T.C. 129 (1949); Arnold P.
Bark, 6 T.C. 851 (1946).
88. See, e.g., Harold C. Pike, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 31,012 (1971); Beatrice H. Albert,
13 T.C. 129 (1949). But see Emil J. Michaels, 53 T.C. 269 (1969), acquiesced in, 1973-2 Cums.
BULL.

8.

89. 283 F.2d 491, 1960-2 U.S.T.C. 9771 (9th Cir. 1960).
90. Id. at 495, 1960-2 U.S.T.C. at 78,159.
91. Id.
92.

Rather than temporary versus indefinite, the logical dichotomy would appear to

be either temporary versus permanent or definite versus indefinite. The Commissioner
has attempted to require absolute certainty in the taxpayer's expectation of the temporary
nature of the assignment in order for the exception to apply.
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a taxpayer should reasonably be expected to move his residence to the new
location. It concluded that when the length of an assignment is uncertain, in
that it cannot be determined that it will end within a fixed period, but will
probably end within a brief time period, the taxpayer should not be expected
to move his residence to the new job site.
The Harvey test has merit in that it emphasizes the decision of the taxpayer whether or not to move his residence based upon his expectations as
to the duration of the assignment. Nevertheless, the Treasury has specifically
disapproved the Harvey approach, 93 probably because of the added problems
94
of administration and determination of the taxpayer's time expectations.
The approach used by the Ninth Circuit in Harvey was not entirely
original, 95 but few courts have followed its lead.9 6
DualBusiness
Another doctrine has evolved in cases in which the taxpayer maintains
two businesses or employments at separate locations. Since a taxpayer may
have two places of business, it would be possible under the Treasury's definition of home for him to have two tax homes. The dual business doctrine,
however, provides that a taxpayer can have but one tax home, his primary
place of business.
In Walter F. Brown,97 the first case arising in this factual setting, the
Board of Tax Appeals failed to recognize the need for a special doctrine.
Mr. Brown was the senior partner of a law firm in Toledo, Ohio, when he
received an appointment from President Harding to head a government
committee. Although it was agreed that his Washington assignment was not
to interfere with his Toledo law practice, Mr. Brown found it convenient
to maintain a Washington apartment because his committee work required
his presence every two weeks for varying periods of time from May through
December. The Commissioner asserted that Brown's tax home was Washington, his place of business, and that none of his travel expenses were deductible. The Board noted that the taxpayer divided his time equally between
the Toledo and Washington positions and that his expenses in one of the
two cities would be deductible. Finding that there would be little, if any,
difference in result regardless of which location was considered the taxpayer's
93. Rev. Rul. 61-95, 1961-1 Cum. BuLL. 749.
94. Note, however, that under the Commissioner's test, this same determination of
"expectations" of the taxpayer would have to be made.
95. See, e.g., E.G. Leach, 12 T.C. 20 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 3; James
E. Peurifoy, 27 T.C. 149 (1956), rev'd, 254 F.2d 483, 1957-2 U.S.T.C. 10,045 (4th Cir.
1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 59 (1958).
96. But see Berhow v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 737, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 19233 (D.
Neb. 1968); Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19241 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); Alois J. Weidekamp, 29 T.C. 16 (1958), acquiesced in,
1958-1 CuM. BULL. 6. In Six v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 66, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9694 (2d Cir.
1971), the court emphasized the subjective nature of the test by listing the factors to
be considered in making a determination whether it would be reasonable for taxpayer
to move her residence. Id. at 70, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. at 87,703.
97. 13 B.T.A. 832 (1928), acquiesced in, VIII-I Cum. Bra.. 6 (1929).
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home, it granted Brown's deduction for the expenses incurred in Washington."
In 1947, the Commissioner adopted a primary-secondary analysis of dual
business or employment situations and analogized the temporary versus indefinite exception to that analysis. He stated that "[w]here a taxpayer has
two or more business locations, a temporary shift of emphasis from the
principal to a minor place of business should be regarded as similar in nature
to the temporary departure of a taxpayer having only one business location
from the place where he customarily carries on business during the taxable
year." 99 The primary-secondary approach has become an established adjunct
to the tax home rule in dual business location cases. 100
The Tax Court in Joseph H. Sherman, Jr.'01 outlined the factors to be
considered in determining a taxpayer's primary place of business. Sherman
was a salaried employee of a manufacturing firm in Worchester, Massachusetts.
In 1945 he established a sales business in New York City, retaining his employment in Worchester. During the year, taxpayer spent 216 days in Worchester, 102 days in New York City, and the balance in transit. Although
not clearly specifying the controlling factor, the court stressed (1) that the
taxpayer spent more time in Worchester, (2) that his permanent community
ties were there, and (3) that the Worchester employment supplied a substantial portion of his income. 10 2 Worchester was held to be the taxpayer's
primary place of business and expenses incurred for meals and lodging in
New York were allowed as deductions.
The Service has adopted the factors identified by the Tax Court in
Sherman,'0s but has added that when the taxpayer is an employee at two
locations, income is the most important consideration.- ° Despite the Com98. Id. at 835.
99. I.T. 3842, 1947-1 Cuar. BULL. II, 12.
100. See, e.g., Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249, 1974-1 U.S.T.G. 9192 (6th Cir.
1974); Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 CUM. BULL. 60, 62.
101. 16 T.C. 332 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-2 CuM. BULL. 4.
102. The Tax Court in Sherman stated that a taxpayer, having two occupations or
posts of duty which require him to spend substantial amounts of time in each of two cities,
may deduct his traveling expenses "incurred in connection with attendance upon the one
removed from his residence." 16 T.C. at 337 (emphasis added). The Commissioner rejected
this part of the Sherman decision, Rev. Rul. 55-604, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 49, although he
acquiesced in the holding, 1951-2 CuM. BULL. 4.
103. "The more important factors to be considered in making a factual determination
regarding the location of the taxpayer's principal place of business or 'tax home' are the
total time ordinarily spent by the taxpayer at each of his business posts, the degree of
business activity at each such post, and whether the financial return in respect of each
post is significant or insignificant." Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 51, 52. A curious
result is reached when the taxpayer maintains his residence at his secondary post of employment. Such a taxpayer is away from "home" when he is at his residence and is
allowed to deduct the cost of his meals and lodging at his residence "limited, of course,
to that portion of the family expense for meals and lodging which is properly attributable
to the taxpayer's presence there in the actual performance of his duties in connection
with his secondary employment." Rev. Rul. 55-604, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 49, 51. See Rev.
Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 CuM. BULL. 60; Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 51. But see Julio S.
Mazzotta, 57 T.C. R.C. 427 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 465 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1972).
104. Rev. Rul. 54-147. 1954-1 CuNT. BULL. 51, 52.
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missioner's contentions, however, the time factor has often seemed to be
determinative. 105 When the taxpayer is self-employed, it is the Commissioner's
position that the length of time spent at each location is the crucial factor. 06
The tests utilized in ascertaining the primary place of business represent
an objective rather than a subjective inquiry. In Francis J. Markey, ° 7 however, the Tax Court found that the determinative factor was the taxpayer's
judgment as to which locale's business interests were more important to him.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected this subjective test in favor of an objective inquiry based on the factors previously accepted by the Service and
08
a majority of the courts.
The Necessary Sleep or Rest Rule
The Treasury has long insisted that meal expenses are deductible under
section 162(a)(2) only when incurred incident to travel involving necessary
sleep or rest. The rule, which ultimately received the approval of the Supreme
Court, has produced an extra-statutory categorization of traveling expenses.
The two categories are expenses which involve transportation, meals, and
lodging, the deductibility of which is limited by the sleep or rest rule, and
those which involve only transportation, which are not affected by the rule.
The remainder of this section of the article first examines the "necessary
sleep or rest" rule and then discusses the rules governing the deduction of
transportation expenses incurred on trips not requiring sleep or rest.
The sleep or rest rule originated in a Treasury release dealing with railroad employees required to layover for several hours away from their home
terminals.10 9 The Treasury's position was that meal expenses incurred during
such a layover would be deductible only if the layover was of sufficient
duration to require "necessary" rest."10 The limitation apparently derived
105. See, e.g., Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9192 (6th Cir.
1974); Wills v. Commissioner, 411 F.2d 537, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 9401 (9th Cir. 1969); Dave
Rubin, 26 T.C. 1076 (1956), acquiesced in, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 5, rev'd on other grounds,
252 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1958). But see Arthur C. Puckett, 56 T.C. 1092 (1971), acquiesced in,
1971-2 Cum. BULL. 3.
106. See Rev. Rul. 63-82, 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 33; Rev. Rul. 61-67, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 25.
107. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 31,467 (1972). Markey resided in Lewisburg, Ohio, where
he was an officer in a bank and owned residential rental property, two farms, and a machine
shop. Although retired, he took a position with General Motors in Warren, Michigan,
250 miles away. He stayed in Warren five days a week, returning to Lewisburg on weekends
to attend to his business interests. The Tax Court determined that his primary place of
employment was Lewisburg, despite the fact that he spent 70% of his time and earned
the greater portion of his income in Warren. Markey was thus allowed a deduction for
his meals and lodging while in Warren.
108. Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 19192, (6th Cir. 1974).
The court held that in a dual business situation the taxpayer's designation of one location
as his abode is not dispositive of the question of which location is his tax home for
purposes of §162(a)(2). It reversed the Tax Court's decision and remanded for further
proceedings.
109. I.T. 3395, 1940-2 Cum. BULL. 64, superseded by Rev. Rul. 75-170, 1975-1 CUM. BULL.
60.
110. Id. Rev. Rul. 75-170, 1975-1 Cuss. BULL. 60, essentially restates this position.
See also Rev. Rul. 75-168, 1975-1 Cuss. BULL. 58 (truck drivers).
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from a belief that meal expenses on one-day trips seldom duplicate normal
living expenses."' If there is no duplication, the allowance of a deduction
violates the ban against deductions for personal living expenses."12 Determination of the existence of duplicate expenses on a case-by-case basis would have
generated a disproportionate administrative and judicial burden. Furthermore, since many commuters incur daily meal expenses away from their
residences without the benefit of any deduction, fairness seemed to dictate
3
that the meal expenses of all "day trippers" be denied."1
Despite its logic and practicality, the rule was repeatedly and often successfully challenged, primarily on the ground that it was not supported by the
statutory language. 14 Finally, the Supreme Court resolved the issue in favor
of the Government in United States v. Correll."5 The Court held that the
statutory phrase "meals and lodging" was susceptible of the interpretation
that meal expenses were deductible only in conjunction with lodging, that
the Commissioner's rule-making power authorized his adoption of that construction, and that the sleep or rest rule was supportable on grounds of
fairness and administrative practicality." 6
The scope of the Correll rule is well illustrated by two Court of Appeals
decisions. In Williams v. Patterson,"7 a railroad conductor working out of
Montgomery, Alabama, was allowed a deduction for the expenses of his noon
and evening meals as well as those for a motel room incurred during a
six-hour layover in Atlanta. The elapsed time for the conductor's round trip
from Montgomery to Atlanta, when added to that required for his preparatory
and concluding duties, was approximately sixteen hours. The court stated
its understanding of the correct rule as follows:
If the nature of the taxpayer's employment is such that when away
from home, during released time, it is reasonable for him to need and
to obtain sleep or rest in order to meet the exigencies of his employment or the business demands of his employment his expenditures
(including incidental expenses, such as tips) for the purpose of obtaining sleep or rest8 are deductible traveling expenses under §162(a) (2) of
the 1954 Code."

111. See Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204, 206, 1967-1
(Ist Cir. 1967).
112. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §262.

U.S.T.C.

9300, at 83,739

113. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 302, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 9101, at 86,007
(1967); Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204, 207, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. 9300, at 83,739 (1st
Cir. 1967).
114. See, e.g., Hanson v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 391, 1962-1 U.S.T.C. 9195 (8th Cir.
1962) (rule rejected); Ahrens v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 518, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. 9271.
(S.D. Ill. 1967) (same result).

115. 389 U.S. 299, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 9101, (1967).
116. 389 U.S. at 302-306, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 9101, at 86,007-86,008.
117. 286 F.2d 333, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. 9183 (5th Cir. 1961). The Service announced in
Rev. Rul. 61-221, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 34, superseded by Rev. Rul. 75-170, 1975-1 GUM. BULL.
60 that it would follow Williams.
118. 286 F.2d at 340, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. at 79,393.
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In contrast, the taxpayer in Barry v. Commissioner 19 was denied a deduction for meal expenses incurred on one-day trips which lasted as long as
nineteen hours, despite the fact that it was occasionally necessary for him
to take catnaps in his car before returning home. The court found that
the necessary rest stops were not of sufficient duration to cause "a significant
increase in expenses." 120 Thus, the practical effect of the Correll rule seems
to be that meal expenses are not deductible unless incurred in conjunction
with lodging or incidental to travel requiring substantial sleep or rest.' 21
The Correll decision has effectively confined the application of section
162(a)(2) to travel involving necessary sleep or rest.12 2 Transportation expenses
on one-day trips are thus deductible only under the general rule of section
162(a). 23 While this result was neither recognized in Correll nor suggested
by its rationale,'- it is consistent with the legislative history indicating that
the predecessor of section 162(a)(2) was added primarily to establish the
25
deductibility of meal and lodging expenses.
TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES

Nondeductibility of "Commuting" Expenses
As previously noted, transportation expenses not involving necessary sleep
or rest are deductible only if they qualify as ordinary and necessary business
expenses under the general language of section 162(a). 2 6 Because that language
119. 435 F.2d 1290, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9126 (1st Cir. 1971).
120. Id. at 1291, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 85,612.
121. The Correll rule is not applicable to situations in which the

taxpayer is

required to stay at his normal work post for a period requiring necessary sleep and
rest since the taxpayer is not away from home under either interpretation of that term.
Home means something more than a particular building which serves as a place of business

or residence. The general metropolitan area of a taxpayer's principal place of business
or residence, depending on which interpretation of home is adopted, constitutes his
home. See Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 261; Rev. Rul. 190, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 303.
122. See, e.g., Sanders v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 296, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9260 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); United States v. Tauferner, 407 F.2d 243, 1969-1
U.S.T.C. 9241 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 812 (1969); William B. Turner, 56 T.C.
27 (1971).
123. Harold Gilberg, 55 T.C. 611, 614 (1971).
124. The Correll decision dealt only with the deductibility of meals. Its rationale was
based largely on (1) the policy of administrative fairness and certainty and (2) a statutory
interpretation of "meals and lodging" which allows a deduction for meal expenses only

where incurred in conjunction with lodging. At no point did the court state that
"traveling expenses" per se could only exist on overnight trips. See Comment, Federal Income Taxation-A Survey of Commuting Deductions Under §162 of the Internal Revenue
Code and the Ramifications of United States v. Correll, 60 Ky. L.J. 427, 436-39 (1972).
125. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
126. See, e.g., Sanders v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 296, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9260 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); William B. Turner, 56 T.C. 27 (1971); Rev. Rnl. 55-109,
1955-1 CUM. BULL. 261, 264.
It is possible, of course, for transportation expenses to be deductible as "travel" expenses
under §162(a)(2). In several situations arising in the overnight travel context, transportation
expenses are allowed as a deduction when otherwise they might be considered nondeductible commuting expenses.
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does not require that expenses be incurred away from home, the tests developed
127
in the application of the tax home concept do not control their deductibility.
When single day travel occurs within the general area of a taxpayer's home,
the deductibility of transportation expenses depends on whether they represent
(1) travel between two business locations' 128 or (2) travel between one's personal
residence and a business location.129 Transportation costs incurred in travel
of the first type are termed "transportation expenses" by the Commissioner
and are generally held to be deductible.130 Transportation costs attributable
to travel of the second type are termed "commuting expenses" and are
generally deemed nondeductible.1 3' A deduction for commuting expenses
within the general area of a taxpayer's home is denied if the destination
is the taxpayer's regular place of business or a place to which his business
takes him only once. Travel from a taxpayer's residence to a temporary
business location outside the general area of his primary place of business,
however, has generally been held to generate deductible "transportation
32
expenses."1
In all temporary assignments away from home for which the taxpayer is allowed a
deduction for meals and lodging, a deduction is allowed for transportation expenses incurred
by the taxpayer on trips home for the weekends. Even though these expenses are personal
expenses, they are deductible in lieu of and limited in amount to those expenses the
taxpayer would have incurred for meals and lodging had he remained at the temporary
employment site. Henry G. Lewia, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 31,489 (1972), afj'd per curiam,
506 F.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 Cum. BULL. 60. Additionally,
when the taxpayer is temporarily away from home, his daily transportation expenses from
his temporary lodging site to his business location are allowed as a travel deduction.
Rev. Rul. 63-145, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 86.
127. William B. Turner, 56 T.C. 27, 31 (1971); Unice C. White, 21 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. %25,415 (1962).
128. Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 261; cf., TLEAS. REG. §1. 6 2-1(g).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Tauferner, 407 F.2d 243, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 19241 (10th
Cir. 1969); TREAS. REG. §1.162-2(e).
130. See, e.g., Arthur C. Puckett, Jr., 56 T.C. 1092 (1971); TRrAs. REG. §1.62-1(g); Rev.
Rul. 63-82, 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 33; Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 Cu.,. BULL. 261.
131. See, e.g., J.M. O'Hare, 54 T.C. 874 (1970); Frank H. Sullivan, B.T.A. 93 (1924);
TREAS. REG. §1.262-1(b)(5); Rev. Rul. 56-25, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 152.
132. For a practical application of this distinction, compare Hulme v. United States,
1965-2 U.S.T.C. 9499 (W.D. Cal. 1965), with Steinhort v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 496, 1964-2
U.S.T.C. 9701 (5th Cir. 1964). The Commissioner has always deemed such travel beyond
one's general area of employment to generate deductible transportation expenses. See
Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 261; Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 75; Rev. Rul.
190, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 303. Confusion has developed with regard to these costs only after
the decision in United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 9101 (1967). See
Unice C. White, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
31,345 (1972); William B. Turner, 56
T.C. 27 (1971) (subsequently vacated and remanded on respondent's motion by an unpublished order). In both White and Turner, the Tax Court denied deductions for
transportation expenses between residence and temporary employment site outside general
area of employment. In Lawrence W. Norwood, 66 T.C. No. 45 (June 15, 1976), the Court
allowed a deduction under §162(a) for transportation expenses between the taxpayer's
home and temporary employment location outside the general area of his principal place
of employment. The government had conceded that the expenses were deductible if the
taxpayer's employment was temporary in nature.
Although some courts have maintained that the temporary versus indefinite rule
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The "Bulky Tool" Exception

The only situation in which the Commissioner has allowed a deduction
for any portion of commuting expenses is one in which the mode of transportation serves some business purpose beyond getting the taxpayer from
his home to a business destination or vice-versa. 1'3 In Revenue Ruling 63100,13- the Commissioner took the position that a taxpayer who found it
necessary to use his auto in transporting work implements between his
residence and place of work could deduct the entire amount of his transportation expenses if two conditions were met: (1) the tools must be too bulky to
be carried otherwise; and (2) he would not have used his auto "except for"
the need to carry the tools. The rationale for this position was that such
expenses are incurred primarily due to business rather than personal reasons. 135
The application of the "bulky tool" exception generated conflict among
the courts in situations in which the taxpayer would have used the same
means of transportation with or without the tools. 36 The Tax Court allowed
no deduction unless the necessity of transporting equipment required the
taxpayer to employ a more expensive mode of commuting to and from
work.' 3 The measure of the allowable deduction was the incremental cost
allocable to the equipment. 38 The Second'39 and Seventh' 40 Circuits, however,
took the position that even where the taxpayer would have used the same
mode of transportation notwithstanding the necessity of carrying the tools, a
proportionate amount of the taxpayer's commuting expenses were deductible.
Confronting the issue in Fausner v. Commissioner,'4' the Fifth Circuit
rejected the approach of the Second and Seventh Circuits and affirmed the
Tax Court's disallowance of the taxpayer's deduction. The court reasoned
that there was no rational basis for an allocation between the commuting
and business components of the expense in the absence of some expense in
does not apply to transportation expenses (see note 127 supra), Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2
Cur. BULL. 75, 82, indicates that the temporary-indefinite test is clearly relevant in
this area. See also Lawrence W. Nonvood, 66 T.C. No. 45 (June 15, 1976). It was the

failure of the court to recognize the applicability of this test that caused the denial of
the deductions in Turner and White.
133. Rev. Rul. 75-380, 1975-2 Cum. BuLL. 59. Perhaps an additional exception here
is commuting expenses from one's temporary lodging to his temporary employment site
when he is away from home overnight. However, such expenses are not commuting
expenses in the true sense, since the taxpayer is considered to be in a continuous travel
status. See Rev. Rul. 63-145, 1963-2 Cun. BULL. 86.
134. 1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 34.
135. Id.
136. See Harold Gilberg, 55 T.C. 611 (1971).
137. Robert A. Hitt, 55 T.C. 628 (1971).
138. Id. at 633.
139. Sullivan v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 1007, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. 9104 (2d Cir. 1967).
140. Tyne v. Commissioner, 409 F.2d 485, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (7th Cir. 1969).
9180 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 413 U.S. 838, 1973-2
141. 472 F.2d 561, 1973-1 U.S.T.C.
U.S.T.C. 9515 (1973). Fausner was a commercial airline pilot ,who attempted to deduct
his entire commuting expenses of driving from his home to the airport on the theory
that they were incurred to carry his flight and overnight bags, even though he would

have driven his auto in any event.
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excess of the ordinary costs of commuting. 14? The Supreme Court settled the
issue when it affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit, substantially adopting
the reasoning of that court and reiterating that an allocation between deductible and nondeductible expenses may be possible where additional ex1 43
penses are incurred for transporting job-required tools.

The Service subsequently issued REv. RUt. 75-380144 in an attempt to
clarify its position in light of Fausner. The ruling held that transportation
expenses incurred "in addition to ordinary nondeductible commuting
expenses" are deductible if the additional costs are attributable solely to the
necessity of transporting work implements and if they can be accurately
145
determined.
The ruling also held that when the taxpayer is required to make use of
a more expensive mode of transportation to carry job-required materials, a
deduction will be allowed for only that portion of the expense of carrying
work implements "by the mode of transportation used which is in excess
of cost of commuting by the same mode without the work implements."' 46
In other words, contrary to his position in REv. RUL. 63-100,47 the Commissioner will not allow a deduction for any portion of the basic cost of
commuting even if the taxpayer's carrying of job-required tools necessitates
the use of more expensive means of commuting. The apparent rationale for
the Commissioner's current position is his belief that the entire cost of
commuting, regardless of the fact that some portion of the expense was
incurred for business reasons alone, constitutes a nondeductible personal
expense.
Nothing in the opinions of the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit in
Fausner suggests that the added expense of commuting caused by the taxpayer's required shift to a more costly mode of transportation is a nondeductible personal expense. Fausner supports the contrary implication that
this increased cost is an ordinary and necessary business expense if the taxpayer can establish that the more expensive mode of transportation was used
solely because of the necessity of carrying the tools.14 8 In this situation, the

taxpayer has incurred an expense in excess of his normal commuting expenses
and should be allowed to deduct that excess.

142. The court noted, citing Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 34, that nothing
in its opinion was intended to prevent the deduction of expenses in addition to ordinary
commuting expenses which were incurred to carry necessary tools. 472 F.2d at 563 n.2,
1973-1 U.S.T.C. at 80,263 n.2.
143. Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838, 839, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9515, at 81,629 (1973),
citing Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 34.
144.

1975-2 CuM. BULL. 59.

145. It expressly invalidates the "but for" test of Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 Cuar. BULL.
34, and provides that the deduction depends solely on whether the taxpayer incurred
additional expenses in carrying the tools. Rev. Rul. 75-380, 1975-2 CUM. BULL. 59, 60.
146.

Rev. Rul. 75-380, 1975-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 60.

147. 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 34. In this situation, the Commissioner had previously allowed
the taxpayer to deduct the entire amount of his commuting expenses.
148. See notes 142 and 1,13 supra, which discuss both the Fifth Circuit's and Supreme
Court's approving citation of Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 34 in Fausner.
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RECOMMENDED APPROACH

The Tax Home Concept
The refusal of the Supreme Court to define the term "home" in Flowers
and its ability to decide the case without making a commitment to either
of the possible interpretations raises the question whether it would make
any difference whether home is the place of residence or place of business in
most litigated cases. Prior to Flowers, the courts frequently denied deductions to taxpayers who incurred travel expenses because they chose not to
live in the vicinity of their principal place of employment by constructing
the word "home" to mean place of business. 149
By utilizing the approach of Flowers, however, all deductions denied by
the artificial tax home concept could be rejected even if home were deemed
the place of residence. When a taxpayer's residence is far away from his
principal place of business, duplicate living expenses result from personal
choice as to the location of the residence rather than from the exigencies
of business and may be denied for that reason alone. For example, in Barnhill v. Commissioner,"50 which involved a judge who resided in a city different
from that in which his court sat, the Commissioner could have conceded
that the taxpayer was away from home and argued that it was the taxpayer's
personal choice to incur duplicate living expenses.
Elimination of the artificial tax home concept would also simplify cases
involving taxpayers who maintain no regular abode and therefore incur no
duplicate expenses. The policy underlying the allowance of a deduction for
living expenses while a taxpayer is "away from home" is "to mitigate the
burden of the taxpayer who, because of the exigencies of his trade or business,
must maintain two places of abode and thereby incur additional and duplicate
living expenses."' 5' This policy can be effectuated only if a requirement that
the taxpayer incur duplicate expenses is incorporated into the "away from
home" requirement.152 Thus, if the place of residence were considered to be
the taxpayer's home as is proposed here, a taxpayer with no regular place of
abode would have no tax home, even though he may have a place of business
to which he frequently returns. Such an interpretation of home would better
serve the policy behind the deduction allowed by section 162(a)(2).
In Rosenspan v. United States,"'s the Second Circuit adopted this construction of home. The taxpayer, a traveling salesman, was employed by
two New York City jewelry manufacturers. Rosenspan traveled through his
sales territory in the Middle West for approximately 300 days a year, but
returned to New York City five or six times during the year to work at
his employers' offices. While in New York City, he occasionally stayed at
his brother's house in Brooklyn where he stored some of his belongings.
149.
150.
at note
151.
152.
153.

See, e.g., William L. Tracy, 39 B.TA. 578, acquiesced in, 1939-2 Cum. BULL. 37.
148 F.2d 913, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. %9260 (4th Cir. 1945). See discussion of the case
57 supra and accompanying text.
Ronald D. Krol, 49 T.C. 557, 562 (1968).
See the discussion of legislative history at text accompanying notes 8-28, supra.
438 F.2d 905, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. %9241 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
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Although Rosenspan did not contribute to its maintenance, he also used his
brother's home as an address for purposes of voting and filing his tax returns.
The Commissioner contended that home, although generally defined as
principal place of business, should be construed as residence if the taxpayer
is constantly traveling. The taxpayer argued that New York City was his
principal place of business and therefore his tax home. Disallowing the deduction, the court held simply that home means residence in all situations;
since Rosenspan maintained no residence, he had no home to be "away from."
The Second Circuit surveyed the decisions of the Supreme Court in this area
and concluded that the same results could have been reached in those cases
if the residence interpretation of home had been followed and the business
exigencies requirement of Flowers invoked. The court refused "to read the
words 'away from home' out of the statute . . . and allow a deduction to a
1 54
taxpayer who had no home in the ordinary sense."'

Although the courts have not always agreed on whether duplication of
expenses is a necessary condition for the deduction of travel expenses, 155
its importance has been increasingly recognized in recent years. 150 Deductions
have rarely been allowed to taxpayers who incurred no duplicate living
expenses. 157 In Steve L. Krase,158 for example, the taxpayer was hired by
his employer on May 20, 1968, and assigned to Sioux Falls, South Dakota. He
remained there until August 25, 1969, at which time he was transferred to
Meridian, Mississippi, where he stayed through 1972. During this time, Krase's
only ties to other areas were the maintenance of a bank account, registration
with the Selective Service, payment of property taxes, and the storage of
some personal belongings in Kansas. The Tax Court held that although the
assignments were temporary, Krase was not away from home while in Sioux
Falls and Meridian since he did not establish that he maintained two
places of abode and had thereby incurred duplicate living expenses." 9
154. Id. at 912, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 85,971. The court identified one anomaly of the
tax home rule under which a deduction for meal and lodging expenses incurred by a
taxpayer while away from his residence on business would be denied solely because he
had no principal business location. This anomaly no longer exists. In Rev. Rul. 71-247,
1971-1 GuM. BULL. 54, the GCmmissioner created still another exception to the tax home
concept. The ruling held that when a taxpayer has multiple places of employment which
are temporary and the locations of which he could not predict, his home will be deemed
his actual residence. Rev. Rul. 73-529, 1973-2 GuM. BULL. 37, outlines the factors to be
considered in determining whether a taxpayer has a "regular place of abode in a real
and substantial sense," or whether he is an itinerant.
155. See, e.g., Fisher v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 79, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. 9258 (7th Cir.
1956); Whitman v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 845, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. 9150 (W.D. La. 1965);
Emil J. Michaels, 53 T.C. 269 (1969), acquiesced in, 1973-2 CUm. BULL. 3.
156. See, e.g., Brandl v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 697, 1975-1 U.S.T.C. 9414 (6th Cir.
1975); Rosenspan v. U.S., 438 F.2d 905, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19241 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 864 (1971); United States v. Matthews, 332 F.2d 91, 1964-2 U.S.T.C. 19506 (9th
Cir. 1964); James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. 9735 (9th Cir. 1962).
157. Charles G. Gustafson, 3 T.C. 998 (1944), not acquiesced in, 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 37.
158. 35 CCH Tax Ct. Mein. 133,694 (1976).
159. Accord, Delbert C. ]Files, 35 CCH Tax Ct. Memn. 33,671 (1976); Frank M. Norris,
35 CCH Tax Ct. Memn. 133,667 (1976).
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If the residence of the taxpayer were deemed his tax home, the analytical
problems would be less complex than those created by the artificial tax home
concept since the deduction would hinge primarily on the exigencies of the
business requirement. For instance, the taxpayer's home would no longer
follow the taxpayer wherever he went, so long as he had a regular abode; 160
an exception holding that "home" is the taxpayer's residence when there is
no primay place of business would no longer be required;' 6 ' and courts
could often avoid struggling with the temporary-indefinite exception, the
exigencies of the business requirement, and the primary-secondary place of
employment dichotomy if it were initially recognized that there is no justification for a deduction without duplicate expenses.
The only apparent stumbling block to the definition of home proposed
here is the Supreme Court's decision in Stidger v. United States.162 A Marine
Captain attached to an aviation squadron received change of station orders
to Iwakuni, Japan, for a 15-month tour. Because he could not take his family,
the taxpayer continued to maintain a residence for his wife and family in
California. The Tax Court denied deductions for taxpayer's meals while in
Japan on the ground that his tax home was in Japan.163 Holding that taxpayer's home was his actual residence in California,'6 the Ninth Circuit
reversed. The Supreme Court reinstated the Tax Court's decision, ruling
that a military taxpayer's home for tax purposes was his permanent duty
station and that Stidger was not away from home.
Significantly, the Supreme Court narrowly confined its ruling in Stidger
to the facts presented. It noted that the relevant statutes had been reenacted
several times after the commissioner's tax home concept was first adopted,
but stated:
[I]t is not necessary for us to decide here whether this congressional
action (or inaction) constitutes approval and adoption of the Commissioner's interpretation of "home" in all of its myriad applications since,
in the context of the military taxpayer, the Commissioner's position
has a firmer foundation. 6 5
The unique situation of the military taxpayer stems from the relatively
frequent changes in assignments, often involving remote locations. Furthermore, a serviceman receives subsistence 66 and quarters 67 allowances for meals
and lodging which are tax exempt. 6 Accordingly, the Court chose to leave
to Congress the task of remedying any inadequacies in the system of military
compensation.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166

See, e.g., Charles Forsythe, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. %31,033 (1971).
Rev. Rul. 71-247, 1971-1 Cum. BuLL. 54.
386 U.S. 287, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. %9309 (1967).
40 T.C. 896 (1963).
Stidger v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 294, 1965-1 U.S.T.C. %9161 (9th Cir. 1965).
386 U.S. at 292, 1967-1 US.T.C. at 83,769 (emphasis added).
37 U.S.C. §402 (1972).

167. "Id.§403 (1972).
168. See Rev. Rul. 63-64, 1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 30.
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The government's argument in Stidger that Congress had impliedly adopted
the definition of home as place of business must be answered, however,
before the definition proposed here can be accepted. The argument was
based largely on the history of the treatment of Congressmen under section
162(a). The Tax Court in George W. Lindsayos had held that the meal and
lodging expenses of a Congressman during his stay in Washington were nondeductible since his tax home was in that city. In 1951, Congress responded
by amending section 162(a) to state that a Congressman's home is deemed to
remain in his home electoral district. 170 The government urged in Stidger
that by amending the statute without providing that home was generally
synonomous with residence, Congress had accepted the tax home concept
and merely carved out an exception to cover the special problems of Congressmen. 171 While this reasoning may be appealing, a review of the legislative
history of this amendment clearly indicates that the purpose was not to carve
out an exception. The debates clearly reflect the belief of the legislators that
they were only providing for themselves what was available to all other
individuals in a similar situation.172 Therefore, instead of making an exception
to the tax home concept for Congressmen, the meaning of the term home
was not considered at all.
If home can as easily mean residence as place of business, it remains
to be determined what should qualify as a residence. An obscure informational
ruling by the Commissioner in 1922 established that a salesman would qualify
for a deduction if he maintains a "house or other living quarters to which
he may at any time return or which is at all times available for his use.''17 3
Such a definition of residence would appear to satisfy the duplicate expense
requirement of the away from home provision. Accordingly, if a taxpayer
maintains in his home town only a post office box, relations with a local stock
broker and insurance agent, and family ties, he has no home and his travel
expenses should not be deductible. 4 Similarly, if a taxpayer maintains a
home for his aged parents, his returns are more like visits than returns to a
personal headquarters and that place should not be deemed his home. a
169. 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936).
170. Act of July 9, 1952, ch. 598, 66 Stat. 467. The amendment is now the second
sentence of §162(a).
171. Without consulting the legislative history of that amendment, an equally persuasive argument could be made that Congress intended to affirm the meaning of home
as residence and merely place a limit of $3000 on the amount of deductions.
172. 99 CONG. Rac. 7003-4 (1953) (remarks of Congressman McCormack); 98 CONG.
Rac. 9672-3 (1952) (remarks of Congressman McGrath).
173. I.T. 1490, 1-2 GuM. BULL. 89 (1922). Cf. Rev. Rul. 73-529, 1973-2 CUM. BULL. 37.
174. James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. J9735 (9th Cir. 1962). In
Fisher v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 79, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. [9258 (7th Cir. 1956), the Seventh
Circuit correctly held that even though (1) the taxpayer was an original native of milwaukee;
(2) he was registered to vote there; (3) his automobile was registered there; (4) he normally
gave Milwaukee as his address; (5) he filed income tax returns from that district; (6) he
paid a $5 monthly phone bill there; and (7) he stored his off-season clothing there, the
apartment of his mother-in-law was not his home since he paid no part of the rent.
175. Whitman v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 845, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. 9150 (W.D. La.
1965).
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There is little case law on this issue, however, since a majority of the courts
accept the Commissioner's tax home concept.
The Temporary versus Indefinite Criteria
The model proposed here retains the temporary versus indefinite dichotomy
as an extension of the exigencies of business requirement of Flowers. When
the duration of an employment at a new location is expected to be temporary
at its commencement, it is unreasonable to expect a taxpayer to move his
residence; the resulting duplication of expenses is therefore caused by the
exigencies of business. Conversely, if a taxpayer undertakes employment
permanently or for an indefinite period of time at a new location, he will
decide to retain his old residence only as a matter of personal choice and
not as a result of business exigencies.
An employment is considered "temporary" only if it is certain to be
temporary and "indefinite" if it will be permanent or of uncertain duration.
Every case involving the doctrine under current law involves an interplay
of two variables, the length of time and the definiteness of the taxpayer's
expectations. The doctrine can be improved by establishing a fixed period of
time to distinguish temporary from permanent. The question "How long is
too long?" is not suited to case-by-case resolution. Because judicial opinions
will inevitably vary, similarly situated taxpayers will not be treated equally
unless a fixed and uniformly applicable answer is given to the question. If
a fixed time period were established, the only issue remaining in a litigated
case would be whether the taxpayer reasonably expected that his assignment would last no longer than that period. In terms of the basic underlying consideration, the decision of the taxpayer not to move his residence
would be conclusively presumed reasonable when he had a reasonable expectation that his assignment would last no longer than the fixed period.
Section 217, which allows a deduction for moving expenses associated
with permanent moves, provides guidance in the selection of a fixed period
to distinguish temporary from permanent. 17 6 A condition for the moving
expense deduction is that an employee be employed for 39 out of the first
52 weeks at the new place of business.7 7 A necessary implication supported by
the legislative history178 is that Congress believed that 12 months was a
reasonable line of demarcation beyond which a move is clearly permanent
and justifies a deduction for moving expenses. Thus, it is reasonable to condude that Congress would expect a taxpayer to move his residence only if
he anticipated that the new assignment would last at least 12 months.1 9 The
176. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §217.
177. Id. §217(c)(2)(A). A self-employed person must work at a new place of business
for 78 out of the first 104 weeks. Id. §217(c)(2)(B).
178. The legislative history of the section reveals that moving expenses were considered

a cost of earning income and thus deductible, but only if associated with a permanent
move. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 805 (1964).
179. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the allowance vel non of the moving
expense deduction should determine the deductibility of travel expenses. If the taxpayer
expected a period of duty of 11 months away from home, for example, he should not
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Commissioner has used 12 months as a rule of thumb to distinguish temporary
from permanent" ° moves and the rule of thumb should be made a rule of
law.
It is not possible, however, to avoid a factual inquiry into the definiteness
of a taxpayer's expectations. Apparently the Commissioner requires that a
8
taxpayer's expectation be certain or absolute.' The approach recommended
here would be less demanding and require only a showing that the taxpayer
could reasonably have expected to be temporarily away from home at the
inception of the new assignment.
The burden is properly on the taxpayer to prove the reasonableness of
his expectations. Practically, it would seem that the actual duration of the
employment should temper the degree of the taxpayer's burden. If the
length of stay is less than the period fixed as being temporary, the burden
of the taxpayer to show that he did not initially expect to stay longer may
be relatively slight. To avoid the tacking of a series of temporary periods
at one location, the taxpayer should have a heavy burden of proof as to
the reasonableness of his expectations if the employment lasts substantially
longer than the fixed period. The longer the actual period of stay, the
greater the burden should be.

82

be expected to move his residence and a travel deduction should be allowed, despite the
fact that he could possibly have qualified for a moving expense deduction had he moved
his home. Similarly, if the taxpayer reasonably expected the period of stay to be 15
months, he should be expected to move his home at the time and should not be eligible
for a travel deduction even though a premature termination of his employment may
make him ineligible for the moving expense deduction. For purposes of a travel deduction,
the crucial consideration is the expectation of the taxpayer at the commencement of the
assignment. See text accompanying note 87 supra. Under §217(d)(3), the determination o1
the deductibility of the expense is based on an after the fact consideration of the actual
time spent in employment at the new place of business.
180. Revenue Ruling 60-189 states: "[A] stay of anticipated or actual duration of a
year or more at a particular location must be viewed . . . as strongly tending to indicate
presence there beyond a temporary period, and cases involving such an employment or
stay will normally for that reason alone be subjected to close scrutiny." Rev. Rul. 60-189,
1960-1 CuM. BULL. 60, 63.
181. See notes 85-96 supro and accompanying text for a critical discussion of the Commissioner's definition of "temporary" and a more desirable approach to this problem.
182. The courts have yet to provide a lucid explanation of the considerations involved
when a taxpayer initially expects a period of stay to be temporary, but decides to remain
permanently at a later time. See, e.g., Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491, 1960-2 U.S.T.C.
9771 (9th Cir. 1960); Lawrence W. Norwood, 66 T.C. No. 45 (June 15, 1976); Robert J.
31,487 (1972); Richard W. Beebe, 30 CCH Tax Ct.
Carr, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
Mem. 31,136 (1971). The taxpayer's expectation should control up to the time his expectations changed and a deduction for his expenses for this period should be allowed.
Norwood and Beebe are rare cases which make this distinction. But if the ultimate
consideration is to be whether the taxpayer should reasonably have been expected to
move his residence, the distinction should be recognized.
Because the controlling consideration is the taxpayer's expectation as to the length
of stay at the time the position was acquired (see text accompanying note 177 supra)
an expectation of indefinite employment, either in the sense that the taxpayer has no
idea how long it might last, or that he reasonably expects it to last beyond the fixed period
of time, could never change to temporary. Even when the actual period of employment is
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DualBusiness and Multiple Employments
When a taxpayer conducts his business or performs his duties as employee
in more than one place, he may deduct only those traveling expenses associated
with the secondary place of business or employment.' s3 Current law derives
this rule from the conclusion that the primary place of a taxpayer's business
or employment is his tax home.'8 The rule is retained in the model proposed
here as an element of the business exigencies requirement. Expenses incurred
by a taxpayer at his primary place of business are not incurred as a result
of the exigencies of business, but rather as a result of his personal decision
to maintain his home elsewhere. 8 5
The principal factor relevant in determining a taxpayer's primary place
of business or employment should be the amount of time spent by the taxpayer at each location. Ultimately, the issue turns on where a taxpayer could
most reasonably be expected to maintain his residence, since expenses resulting from locating a residence elsewhere are deemed to be personal. Most
persons faced with the question would choose to reside in the locale of
the place where most of their working hours are spent. Many courts 18 6
and the Commissioner 8 7 although recognizing that time is normally the most
important factor, also look to the extent of the business interests in the- two
locations, community ties, and income earned at each location. When such
less than the fixed period of time here suggested, the taxpayer could get no deduction
since he should reasonably have moved his residence at the commencement of the employment. An alternate and more equitable solution to the dilemma of the taxpayer not
moving because his expectations are indefinite may be a rule, promulgated either by
statute or regulation, that the deduction would be allowed regardless of taxpayer's initial
expectations if the actual period of the assignment is less than the fixed period of time.
The results reached under such an approach would probably conform closely with those
obtained under present law because of the Commissioner's reluctance to challenge a deduction for periods which in fact are temporary. See Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 Cums. BULL. 60, 63.183. In most dual business or employment cases, the issue is not whether deductible
expenses have been incurred, but rather is the problem of identifying which expenses are
deductible. If a taxpayer works in city A and city B, for example, he may deduct
expenses incurred in one of the places of employment. The difficulty is in determining
whether it is the A expenses or the B expenses which are to be allowed. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
184. Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 Cum. BULL. 60; Rev. Rul. 55-604, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 49;
Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 Cuss. BULL. 51.
185. For example, in Frank B. Matteson, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 32,547 (1974), afJ'd
per curiam, 514 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1975), the taxpayer was director of nursing at a hospital
in one city, but in the evenings assisted her husband, a medical doctor, at their home in
another city by relaying messages, dispensing medicine and treating minor injuries. The
court, relying on the business exigencies requirement, held that the primary reason for
the taxpayer's travel between the hospital and her home was personal rather than
business and disallowed her deduction for travel expenses. See also Julio S. Mazzotta, 57
T.C. 427 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 465 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1972); J. Paul Presault, 34 CCH
Tax Ct. Mern. 33,203 (1975).
186. See, e.g., Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9192 (6th Cir.
1974); Vincent Treanor, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 18,242 (1951); Joseph H. Sherman, 16
T.C. 332 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 51.
187. Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 Cuss. BULL. 51.
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other factors lead to results different from those following from giving time
spent controlling significance, the results will usually be wrong. Assume,
for example, that a taxpayer obtains new employment in city B, but retains
part-time employment, his residence, and his community ties in city A. His
decision not to move to city B is very likely a personal choice; his retention
of community ties in city A should not detract from the obvious fact that
his primary place of employment has changed. Accordingly, the taxpayer's
primary place of business for purposes of the recommended approach will
depend on time spent alone.
CONCLUSION

The Commissioner should abandon the tax home doctrine in favor of a
rule which treats a taxpayer's residence as his home in all situations. Such
an interpretation is consistent not only with the legislative history of the
provision and the ordinary meaning of the statutory term home, but also
with the policy underlying the provision. When home is defined as residence,
application of the business exigencies requirement will usually produce results similar to those obtained under the tax home doctrine.
The temporary versus indefinite rule should be viewed as an aspect of
the business exigencies requirement rather than as an exception to the tax
home doctrine. This approach results in conceptual consistency since the
temporary versus indefinite rule applies in some travel situations under section 162(a), as well as section 162(a)(2), and the business exigencies requirement applies to all section 162 expenses.
The Treasury should also modify its test for determining what constitutes
a temporary stay by adopting a fixed period of one year for this purpose. If
the taxpayer, at the commencement of a new assignment, reasonably expected
that his assignment would last no longer than the fixed period, it should be
considered temporary until such time as the facts change.
The congressional reluctance to amend section 162(a)(2) may be indicative
of a satisfaction with the results reached under the present law. The changes
in interpretation recommended here, however, suggest a more intelligible
conceptual approach, which would lead to different results only in a few
instances. Adoption of these changes would enable the courts to render more
intelligible decisions, and. the ensuing certainty would inure to the benefit
of both the Treasury and the traveling taxpayer.
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